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LEGITIMIZING POST-PENETRATION RAPE

I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the law has done more than reflect the restrictive and sexist
views of our society; it has legitimized and contributed to them. In the same
way, a law that rejected those views and respected female autonomy might do
more than reflect the changes in our society; it might even push them forward a
bit.1

In today’s society, sexism is by no means an extinct concept, made
obsolete through the various gender revolutions of the 1960s and ’70s. Rather,
sexism continues to afflict women in numerous societal domains. Some of
these areas have received ample attention and have been accepted by the
general public as legitimate areas of social concern—sexism in the workplace,
sexism in the military, and sexism in the home, for example. Other areas over
which sexism continues to reign, however, have not received as much popular
attention and, consequently, continue to reside in unfamiliar territory. Sexism
in rape law, as well as sexism in societal attitudes toward rape, is one such
arena.2
“Acquaintance rape” is a broad term that describes any rape perpetrated by
someone who knows his victim.3 Countless forms of acquaintance rape exist,
including rape by a lover, husband, friend, co-worker, neighbor, or relative.4
The common denominator in this non-exhaustive list is that each case involves
a woman who is forced to have sex, not by a criminal hiding behind the bushes
in the park, but rather by the guy next door—an attacker in date’s clothing, a
perpetrator not easily identifiable as criminal by outward appearances. These
1. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1093–94 (1986).
2. See id. at 1090. This is not to say, of course, that literature dealing with rape and rape
law is scarce. On the contrary, many scholarly and popular publications have addressed the issue
of rape, particularly in recent years. Id. For the general public, however, the topic of sexism in
rape law is still far from mainstream.
3. Laurie Bechhofer & Andrea Parrot, What is Acquaintance Rape?, in ACQUAINTANCE
RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 9, 12 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991) [hereinafter
HIDDEN CRIME].
4. David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Criminal Law: Rape in the Criminal Justice System,
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1202–03 (1997). “Date rape,” which occurs between two
people who are on a date or are dating, is probably one of the most commonly known types of
acquaintance rape. Bechhofer & Parrot, supra note 3, at 12.
1229
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rapists may have no other criminal record either, but instead are men that a
woman interacts with in everyday life—they are doctors, mechanics, attorneys,
grocers, accountants, teachers.
As such, the law protects these men from criminal punishment for rape.5
Both historically and currently, acquaintance rape law has been chiefly
reflective of male standards and perspectives, and has thus greatly favored
rapists.6 Corroboration requirements, resistance requirements, and sexist
interpretations of terms like “consent” and “force,” are all prime examples of
this phenomenon.7 For instance, the utmost resistance requirement, which was
the standard for decades and (although no longer the law) continues to
influence rape cases, was based almost entirely on the male notion of the
amount of resistance a woman should employ during an attack.8 How a female
victim of rape would realistically respond to such an assault was deemed
irrelevant.9 In short, although women are the gender most often raped,10 men
are the ones tinkering with exactly what that term means. The male
perspective has and continues to dominate.11
While sexism such as this impacts rape in general, this Comment focuses
mainly on its effect on claims of post-penetration rape. Post-penetration rape
is a relatively unexplored category of sexual assault,12 perhaps because in the
past it has often been enveloped by the more general category of acquaintance
rape. Post-penetration rape is one type of acquaintance rape, but is
distinguished from other forms of sexual assault by timing. A woman who
never gives consent to sex, but is nonetheless forced to engage in intercourse,
is a victim of rape. A woman who initially gives consent to sex, withdraws it
during intercourse, and is then forced to continue intercourse is a victim of

5. It is estimated that the conviction rate for rape is as low as one to four percent. Morrison
Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape
Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1024 (1991).
6. Estrich, supra note 1, at 1092.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 1091.
9. See Kara M. DelTufo, Book Review, Resisting “Utmost Resistance”: Using Rape
Trauma Syndrome to Combat Underlying Rape Myths Influencing Acquaintance Rape Trials, 22
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 419, 424 (2002) (reviewing SUSAN EHRLICH, REPRESENTING RAPE:
LANGUAGE AND SEXUAL CONSENT (2001)).
10. See SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A
SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 33–34 (1979). Only a very small percentage of reported
rapes involved male victims; one study estimated 4 percent. Id. at 33. However, the reporting
rate among male victims of rape is most likely very low as well, perhaps even lower than within
the female population. Id.
11. See Estrich, supra note 1, at 1091, 1094.
12. The term “post-penetration rape” was coined by Amy McLellan, Comment, PostPenetration Rape—Increasing the Penalty, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 779, 780 (1991).
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post-penetration rape.13 In the first example, the act was rape from the moment
of penetration, while in the second example it became rape after penetration
when consent was withdrawn. Because consent initially exists in postpenetration rape cases, the topic easily falls prey to not only the typical sexism
discussed above, but also heightened sexist attitudes about male and female
sex roles, men’s ability to control their sexual impulses, etc. Post-penetration
rape is somewhat of a catch-all for sexism in the world of rape, making it an
area very needful of reform.
Despite this, no state legislature has addressed the issue by passing a
statute legitimizing claims of post-penetration rape; that is, until recently. In
2003, Illinois became the first state to pass legislation recognizing the
existence and validity of the crime of post-penetration rape.14 The statute
makes clear that men must heed women’s withdrawal of consent during sex, or
else be guilty of rape.15 Such a statute is a first step toward respecting female
autonomy in the field of acquaintance rape law and, as such, has the potential
to aid in changing societal attitudes toward post-penetration rape.
This Comment analyzes the ways in which a statute legitimizing the claim
of post-penetration rape is likely to affect sexism in rape law. Part II examines
the way in which post-penetration rape has been dealt with in various state
court decisions. Part III offers a synopsis of the journey sexism in rape law has
experienced in the last half-century, and Part IV discusses the ways in which a
post-penetration statute could curb this sexism. Part V concludes the
Comment, arguing that while a post-penetration rape statute has the potential
to weaken sexism surrounding post-penetration rape, its effects are limited,
making further reform a necessity.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
While Illinois is the first state to deal with post-penetration rape
legislatively, other states have addressed the issue judicially. Two state courts
have issued opinions unequivocally rejecting the concept of post-penetration
rape—Maryland and North Carolina.16 Of the forty-eight remaining states,
seven have unequivocally supported it—Maine, Connecticut, California, South
13. The term “consent” can be misleading. Under typical current law, it does not necessarily
mean that the victim expressly agreed to sex. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE
CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 268 (1998). “Consent” simply means
that the victim had not yet manifested a legally recognized unwillingness to have intercourse. For
example, in most states, no law requires courts to treat a solely verbal refusal “at face value”; just
saying “no” is not enough to negate consent. Id. at 11. Silence is considered implied consent as
well. Id. at 268. Only a few states insist that sexual consent mandates “affirmative and freelygiven permission.” Id. For criticism of the “silence equals consent” approach, see id. at 267–73.
14. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17 (2003).
15. See id.
16. Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266 (Md. 1980); State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760 (N.C. 1979).
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Dakota, Minnesota, Alaska, and Kansas.17 In order to comprehend the sexism
inherent in acquaintance rape law today, it is helpful to examine these judicial
decisions, focusing specifically on the courts’ reasoning and how each either
attacked or supported the struggle for female sexual autonomy.
A.

Courts Limiting Women’s Right to Say “No”

Only two courts have found that once sex has begun, a woman cannot
withdraw her consent. In 1979, the Supreme Court of North Carolina became
the first state court to decide the issue in State v. Way, holding that consent
cannot be withdrawn.18 The following year, in Battle v. State, the Maryland
Court of Appeals followed suit by holding that once given, consent is
absolute.19
The facts of each case are very similar. In both cases, the defendant
tricked the victim into accompanying him to a secluded area, where he
attacked and raped her.20 Also in both cases, the jury sent a note to the judge
during deliberation, inquiring as to whether a woman can withdraw consent
once penetration has occurred.21 Both judges responded in the affirmative, and
both were overruled on appeal.22 In Way, the North Carolina Supreme Court
admitted that consent can be withdrawn, but only when the victim gives
consent for a sexual act and then withdraws it regarding independent
subsequent acts.23If, however, within the same sexual act “actual penetration is
accomplished with the woman’s consent, the accused is not guilty of rape.”24
17. In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662 (S.D. 1994);
State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067 (Me. 1985); State v. Bunyard, 75 P.3d 750 (Kan. Ct. App.
2003); McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994). This list includes
only those states that have published opinions expressly finding consent can be withdrawn. Other
states’ courts may have discussed post-penetration rape as well.
18. Way, 254 S.E.2d at 761–62.
19. Battle, 414 A.2d at 1268–71.
20. In Way, the victim agreed to go on a date with defendant. 254 S.E.2d at 760. After
spending the evening at a friend’s apartment, defendant asked the victim to go upstairs with him
so he could show her something. Id. Almost immediately upon entering his room, defendant
tried to take the victim’s clothes off. Id. She told him “no,” but defendant responded by hitting
her in the face and threatening her with further violence if she did not comply. Id. Defendant
then forced the victim to have anal, oral, and vaginal sex with him. Id. at 760–61. Similarly, in
Battle, the defendant convinced the victim to give him a ride home and accompany him into his
house to view a radio the victim was interested in buying. 414 A.2d at 1267. Upon entering
defendant’s room, defendant hit the victim and threatened her with a screwdriver, stating that he
would kill her if she did not take off her clothes. Id. Defendant then forced the victim to engage
in sexual intercourse. Id.
21. Way, 254 S.E.2d at 761; Battle, 414 A.2d at 1268.
22. Way, 254 S.E.2d at 762; Battle, 414 A.2d at 1271.
23. 254 S.E.2d at 761–62.
24. Id. at 762.
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The court reasoned that if a jury instruction such as the one at issue were
allowed, “the jury could have found the defendant guilty of rape if they
believed [the victim] had consented to have intercourse with the defendant and
in the middle of that act, she changed her mind. This is not the law.”25 In
Battle, the Maryland Court of Appeals explained that once a man has
penetrated a female without consent, it is rape, and “no remission by the
woman or consent from her, however quickly following, can avail the man.”26
The court argued that the opposite must also be true—”if she consents prior to
penetration and withdraws the consent following penetration, there is no
rape.”27 The court implied that post-penetration rape does not exist.
While the overruling courts’ reasoning in each case differed from one
another, the main underlying premise was the same. Once sex begins with the
woman’s consent, her rights disappear and her partner’s subsequent behavior,
however forceful or violent, is justified. His actions are beyond the purview of
rape.
B.

Courts Upholding Women’s Right to Say “No”

Other courts rejected the reasoning in Way and Battle and held that initial
consent does not preclude a woman from changing her mind. These courts did
not explicitly advocate women’s sexual autonomy, but such support can be
implied from their reasoning. Specifically, the following courts focused on
their respective statutory definitions of rape, while also relying greatly on
common sense, in reaching their conclusions.
The Supreme Court of Maine was faced with the issue in State v.
Robinson.28 In holding that consent can be withdrawn, the court stated that
both the legislative intent behind Maine’s Criminal Code “as well as common
sense” supported its decision.29 Maine’s Criminal Codes defines rape as
“‘sexual intercourse’ by the defendant . . . in circumstances by which that other
person submits to the sexual intercourse as a result of compulsion applied by
the defendant.”30 In defining “sexual intercourse” the court focused on the
common, everyday meaning of the term. Plainly, intercourse does not stop
with penetration. Thus, continued penetration after a party has withdrawn
consent “is factually ‘sexual intercourse.’”31 Furthermore, the court stressed
25. Id. at 761–62.
26. 414 A.2d at 1269.
27. Id. at 1270.
28. 496 A.2d 1067 (Me. 1985). In Robinson, the victim let the defendant into her home to
make a phone call after he alleged that his car had run out of gas. Id. at 1069. The victim
testified that defendant then forced her to have sex with him, while defendant claimed that the
victim initially consented, but mid-act decided that she did not want to go through with it. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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the absurdity of a contrary holding. If rape occurs only when a “male’s entry
of the female sex organ is made as a result of compulsion,” rape cases such as
this would “turn on whether the prosecutrix, on revoking her consent and
struggling against the defendant’s forcible attempt to continue intercourse,
succeeds at least momentarily in displacing the male sex organ.”32 Along with
being impracticable, this would be unjust to those who are so overpowered,
physically or by threats of violence, as to make any displacement impossible.33
The court also criticized the North Carolina court’s reasoning in Way. In
stating that a rule allowing withdrawal of consent would leave the defendant
open to a rape charge if the female subjectively changed her mind during sex,
the Way court completely disregarded the “critical element of compulsion.”34
The victim’s change of mind does not make the continuing intercourse rape.
Rather, “[i]t became rape if and when the prosecutrix thereafter submitted to
defendant’s sexual assault” due to threat of physical force or another form of
compulsion.35
In State v. Siering,36 the Appellate Court of Connecticut agreed with
Robinson’s holding. In finding that consent can be withdrawn, the court
focused primarily on Connecticut’s definition of sexual intercourse, as well as
common sense. First, the public act defining “sexual intercourse” stated,
“Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse.”37
The court then looked to the ordinary meaning of “sexual intercourse” and
concluded that the reference to penetration merely established the “minimum
amount of evidence necessary to prove that intercourse has taken place.”38 It
did not mean that intercourse concluded upon penetration. To conclude
otherwise would run afoul of the “axiomatic” principle that “statutes are not to
be interpreted to arrive at bizarre or absurd results.”39 The court went on to
assert that “common sense is not to be left at the courtroom door . . . ‘courts
will not pretend to be more ignorant than the rest of mankind.’”40
Most recently, the Supreme Court of California held that withdrawal of
consent subsequent to penetration, if not heeded by the other party involved,
supports a claim of rape. In In re John Z., the court overruled a California

32. Id. at 1071.
33. Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1071.
34. Id. at 1070.
35. Id.
36. 644 A.2d 958 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994). Here, the victim met defendant in a bar, drove him
home, accompanied him to his room to get his telephone number, and was attacked and raped. Id.
at 959. Just as in Robinson, the defendant alleged that the victim consented but “snapped and
yelled rape” mid-act. Id.
37. Id. at 962.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 963.
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Court of Appeals case, People v. Vela. 41 The Vela court’s reasoning
epitomized male influence on rape law, stating, “[T]he essence of the crime of
rape is the outrage to the person and feelings of the female resulting from the
nonconsensual violation of her womanhood.”42 While the woman may feel a
certain degree of this outrage if she withdraws consent and the male forcibly
continues the act, thus ignoring her wishes, this outrage “could hardly be of the
same magnitude as that resulting from an initial nonconsensual violation of her
womanhood.”43 The Supreme Court of California explicitly rejected this
reasoning in In re John Z., stating that “we have no way of accurately
measuring the level of outrage the victim suffers from being subjected to
continued forcible intercourse following withdrawal of her consent. We must
assume the sense of outrage is substantial.”44 Furthermore, nowhere in
California’s Code does it state that rape is conditioned upon the level of
outrage experienced by the victim.45 The court here also pointed out that many
situations can be imagined where the defendant achieves penetration before the
victim even has a chance to object or resist, 46 such as if the victim were
attacked while sleeping.47

41. In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003). In In re John Z., the victim, a teenage girl, was
forced by the defendant to have sex at a party. Id. at 184–85. The court assumed that the victim
initially consented but withdrew her consent sometime following penetration. Id. at 185.
42. Id. at 186 (quoting People v. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)).
43. Id. Several courts expressed disgust for this reasoning. For example, in State v. Siering,
the Connecticut court found Vela’s arguments to be “archaic and unrealistic.” Siering, 644 A.2d
at 963. The Alaska Court of Appeals in McGill v. State also found that Vela’s reasoning
represented “archaic and outmoded social conventions.” McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 84 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2001).
44. In re John Z, 60 P.3d at 186.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 187.
47. Courts in four other states—South Dakota, Minnesota, Alaska, and Kansas—have also
held that consent can be withdrawn. In State v. Jones, the Supreme Court of South Dakota briefly
explained, “This court has never held that initial consent forecloses a rape prosecution and . . . we
choose not to adopt the position of the Vela case.” 521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D. 1994). Next, just
as in Robinson and Siering, the Courts of Appeals of Minnesota in State v. Crims, Alaska in
McGill v. State, and Kansas in State v. Bunyard found post-penetration rape to be a valid claim
based on each state’s respective statutes. Minnesota defined “penetration both as the initial
intrusion into the body of another and as the act of sexual intercourse.” State v. Crims, 540
N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). This is “a broader reference point than the moment of
slightest intrusion.” Id. Similarly, Alaska’s statutes do “not limit ‘sexual penetration’ to the
moment of initial penetration.” McGill, 18 P.3d at 84. Rather, “sexual penetration” is defined to
include cunnilingus and fellatio, proscribing “a broader range of conduct than genital sexual
intercourse.” Id. Both courts found that these statutes support the conclusion that consent upon
penetration is not definitive. Along these same lines, the court in State v. Bunyard explained that
no Kansas statute states that intercourse ends with penetration. 75 P.3d 750, 756 (Kan. Ct. App.
2003).
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These courts took a much more realistic approach to rape than did the
courts in Way and Battle by taking into consideration the intrusive, fearinvoking nature of rape, even when consent is initially given. Most
importantly, though, these decisions recognize and respect a woman’s right to
change her mind and make her own sexual decisions.
III. THE PREVALENCE OF SEXISM IN RAPE LAW, PAST AND PRESENT
The cases mentioned above offer only a glimpse of the ways in which
women’s sexual autonomy has and continues to be severely restricted, as well
as the ways in which these restrictions are being challenged. Sexism in rape
law has a long history, and the effort to curb this sexism also has an equally
lengthy past. Understanding the journey of rape law in the past half-century, at
least on a rudimentary basis, is imperative to the analysis of the role a postpenetration rape statute will play today. Similarly, awareness of the social
context within which rape law exists presently is integral to any sort of critique
of new rape reform statutes such as the one at issue in this paper. Therefore,
this Section will examine rape law from both a historical, as well as a
contemporary perspective.
Historically, rape law has been relatively rapist-friendly. This becomes
apparent through examination of common rape laws that focused on the
victim’s behavior instead of the rapist’s.48 By placing attention on the victim,
her actions became the subject of scrutiny—her dress, her behavior, her sexual
history were all factors used to determine whether or not she was raped.49 The
first way in which this tendency becomes apparent is through analysis of the
“utmost resistance” requirement prevalent in most jurisdictions until midcentury.50 Rape law has traditionally focused on two main factors—force and
consent.51 Rape only occurred when a man had intercourse with a woman by
force and against her will and consent.52 Up until the 1950s, in order to fulfill
these requirements, a victim had to prove that she used the “utmost” of
resistance against her attacker.53 Focus fell not on the rapist, but rather on the
victim—courts asked not whether the rapist committed the actus reus (guilty
act) of rape with the required mens rea (state of mind), as is usual with other
crimes, but instead asked whether the victim acted appropriately in resisting.54
If she did not, the rapist went free.55
48. Estrich, supra note 1, at 1094.
49. See id. at 1099–1100.
50. DelTufo, supra note 9, at 423–24.
51. Estrich, supra note 1, at 1093.
52. Id.
53. DelTufo, supra note 9, at 423–24.
54. Estrich, supra note 1, at 1094.
55. For a compelling argument that resistance requirements are derived from the “maledominated justice system’s suspicion of rape victims,” see Sakthi Murphy, Comment, Rejecting

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

NO MEANS NO

1237

Resisting to the “utmost” of one’s ability was by no means an easy
standard to meet. While fault lay with the woman if she did not respond
appropriately, what was “appropriate” was gauged by a male standard.56 What
men thought women should do and the extent to which they should be able to
resist governed. If attacked, a man would surely respond by punching,
pushing, or overpowering his assailant. This response was thus deemed to be
“the standard,” meaning everyone, including women, could and should react
similarly. How a reasonable woman would most likely react when attacked,
being greatly overpowered and often fearful of her life, was not considered.57
Unless the victim fought back with almost Herculean strength, her rapist was
acquitted by the court, “not by judging the man and finding his behavior
legitimate, but by judging the woman and finding her conduct substandard.”58
The utmost resistance requirement eventually relaxed by the 1950s and 60s
as courts came to the revelation that, besides being impracticable, resisting to
the utmost of one’s power could potentially increase the victim’s chances of
further physical harm.59 However, the idea of resistance as a prerequisite to a
rape conviction endured.60 “Utmost resistance” evolved into “reasonable
resistance.”61 Women were thought to be too ambivalent toward sex, not
knowing what they wanted, to eradicate the requirement altogether.62 They
said “no,” but they meant “yes,” making it unfair to hold a man guilty of rape
Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on Using a Rape Victim’s Sexual History to Show the
Defendant’s Mistaken Belief in Consent, 79 CAL. L. REV. 541, 545–46 (1991) (“[T]he resistance
requirement has never been part of other crimes. If the general fear were of fabricated crimes,
then all victims would be required to resist, not just victims of rape.”).
56. Estrich, supra note 1, at 1094.
57. See DelTufo, supra note 9, at 424. In practice, the utmost resistance requirement
“discounts the paralyzing nature of women’s fear and therefore reconstructs the events in question
as consensual sex. It presupposes that women have choice and options when confronted with the
threat of sexual aggression and that women are unconstrained in their choice of appropriate
avenues of resistance,” when in reality fear, panic, and inferior strength make these “choices”
highly impracticable. Id.
58. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 32 (1987). See generally Mustafa K. Kasubhai,
Destabilizing Power in Rape: Why Consent Theory in Rape Law is Turned on Its Head, 11 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 53–54 (1996). Kasubhai uses Brown v. State as a prime example of the
extreme nature of the utmost resistance requirement. Id. at 53. In Brown, a sixteen-year old girl
was attacked in a field by a neighbor, pushed to the ground, and raped. 106 N.W. 536, 536 (Wis.
1906). Despite the fact that the victim repeatedly screamed and struggled against her attacker “as
hard as [she] could,” the court found that the victim failed to establish lack of consent. Id. The
court stated “[n]ot only must there be entire absence of mental consent or assent, but there must
be the most vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty within the woman’s power to
resist the penetration of her person.” Id. at 538; see also Estrich, supra note 1, at 1121–32.
59. Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 777, 799 (1988).
60. DelTufo, supra note 9, at 424.
61. ESTRICH, supra note 58, at 37.
62. See id. at 38–41.
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if he forced sex upon a woman who said “no” yet did not physically attempt to
fend off his attack.63 Crying and screaming were not even enough evidence to
put the rapist on notice that his actions were unwanted.64 The victim’s burden
remained high.
Along with the resistance requirement, victims faced a corroboration
requirement that was intensely pro-rapist as well. This mandate stated that a
defendant could not be convicted of rape unless the victim produced
corroborating evidence of sexual assault; the victim’s own testimony was not
Even though no other crime besides perjury mandated
enough.65
corroboration,66 proponents of the requirement maintained that it was vital to
protecting men charged with acquaintance rape. They argued that there existed
a grave “danger of false charges by vindictive or mentally disturbed women,”
although, ironically, no empirical evidence existed to corroborate this
assertion.67 In short, women were liars.68 The corroboration requirement was
also incredibly hard to meet, for rape almost by definition takes place in
private with no witnesses.69 The difficulty in producing evidence was
especially acute in acquaintance rape cases where, as will be discussed later
on, physical injuries are uncommon.70 As a result, “in states where a
corroboration requirement [was] strictly enforced, the effect [was] a
comparatively low rate of conviction.”71
63. Id. at 38. Estrich also points out that rape is not the only crime subject to a consent
defense, but of those crimes, it is the only one that mandates physical resistance. Id. at 40. For
example, regarding trespass, “the posting of a sign or the offering of verbal warnings generally
suffices to meet the victim’s burden of nonconsent.” Id. Or in the case of Miranda v. Arizona, “a
suspect’s ‘no’ must mean no, and questioning must be terminated.” Id. at 41.
64. Id.
65. PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED: ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL 176
(1996). Some states’ corroboration requirements were more stringent than others. In the 1960s
and ’70s, New York, for example, was the most “stringent in the country in requiring that ‘every
material element of a rape—penetration, force and the identity of the rapist—must be
corroborated by evidence other than the victim’s testimony.’” Id. This standard was almost
impossible to meet, resulting in only twenty rape convictions statewide in New York in the
average year in the 1960s. Id.
66. ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAW 104 (1984).
67. CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION
AND ITS IMPACT 24 (1992).
68. The only way in which corroboration requirements could possibly be justified is if
women, as a class, are liars. TONG, supra note 66, at 104. Because if women are not liars, “no
state should still require that rape charges be corroborated with some evidence other than the
victim’s testimony.” Id. Corroboration of any crime is always helpful to the fact-finder in a trial,
but only if the witness were a liar would corroboration be mandated.
69. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 67, at 25.
70. Linda S. Williams, The Classic Rape: When Do Victims Report?, in RAPE AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 55–56 (Jennifer Temkin ed., 1995) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM].
71. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 67, at 25.
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While victims in general suffered under sexist rape laws, none did more so
than women raped by their husbands. “Rape” was often “defined in terms
limited to a man’s rape of a woman who was not his wife,”72 leaving sexually
abused wives outside the scope of legal protection altogether. The “marital
rape exemption” gave men an “absolute privilege to rape their wives, using
whatever degree of force or coercion they pleased.”73 A husband could force
his wife to submit to intercourse using a gun or a knife.74 He could tie his
victim/wife up, beat her, and rape her repeatedly if he wanted.75 And husbands
did—it has been estimated that as many as half of battered women are also
victims of marital sexual assault.76 Despite the frequent incidence of marital
rape, the law has traditionally refused to punish these rapists. However much
force husbands used, “[w]hatever the degree of indignity, humiliation, or
brutality he may impose on her,” the man could not be charged with rape.77
Consequently, “[u]nconditional sexual access to women [was] permanently
institutionalized in marriage.”78
Sexually active women in general felt the wrath of sexist rape laws.
“Under common law, evidence of the victim’s sexual history was admissible to
prove she had consented to intercourse and to impeach her credibility.”79 This
rule of evidence persecuted the victim as much as the rapist, allowing the
defense to cross examine the victim in front of judge, jury, and spectators
about her personal sex life. Defense attorneys attempted to make the victim
look promiscuous or “easy,” as if her prior consent to sex necessarily meant
she consented to sex on the occasion in question. Or worse yet, attorneys
implied that through the victim’s prior sexual acts she, and not the rapist,

72. Kasubhai, supra note 58, at 58.
73. Jaye Sitton, Old Wine in New Bottles: The “Marital” Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. REV.
261, 261 (1993); see also Kasubhai, supra note 58, at 58.
74. DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 1
(1985).
75. Id. Situations such as this are far from uncommon. In a study conducted by Finkelhor
and Yllo, 10 percent of the 323 Boston women surveyed reported that their husbands had forced
them to engage in sexual intercourse by force or threats. Id. at 6–7. The authors list specific
instances of marital rape as well—one woman surveyed was “jumped in the dark by her husband
and raped in the anus while slumped over a woodpile.” Id. at 18. Another “had a six-centimeter
gash ripped in her vagina by a husband who was trying to ‘pull her vagina out.’” Id. Other wives
were raped at knifepoint or were severely beaten before, during, and after the rape. Id. at 18, 23.
76. Id. at 22.
77. Id. at 1.
78. Kasubhai, supra note 58, at 58. This is a very brief overview of the marital rape
exception. For a more in-depth analysis, see generally FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 74; Rene
Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. FAM. L. 559 (1991); Sitton, supra note
73.
79. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 67, at 25.
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should be held responsible for the attack.80 These tactics worked, making it
“less likely that a rapist would be convicted where the victim had a prior
sexual history.”81 Understandably, more women chose not to report their
rapes, knowing that they would be the ones put on trial.82
Today, rape law is more victim-friendly, but only in comparison to the
rape laws of the past.83 Despite reform efforts, rape law continues to give
rapists the advantage. While most statutes no longer require the victim to
resist, “definitions accorded to force and consent may render ‘reasonable’
resistance both a practical and a legal necessity.”84 Any time force is an
element of rape, it will surely be lacking if the victim did not first resist at least
to some degree, since force would be unnecessary without initial resistance.85
Thus, even though proof of resistance may not be required by law, it remains
an essential part of a rape conviction.86 The same principle applies to
corroboration requirements. Such requirements “may have been repealed, but
they continue to be enforced as a matter of practice in many jurisdictions.”87
Prosecutors still decline to prosecute rapists based on lack of strong
corroborating evidence, and jury instructions regarding the irrelevance of
corroborating evidence remain in the judge’s discretion. No safeguard exists
to keep juries from equating lack of corroboration with the rapist’s
innocence.88
Similarly, while the marital rape exception has experienced declining
popularity in recent years, it is far from being extinct.89 As of 1996, thirty-two
states and the District of Columbia had completely abolished the exception.90
However, eighteen states continue to give husbands special sexual privileges
by categorizing marital rape differently than other types of rape, thereby

80. Garth E. Hire, Holding Husbands and Lovers Accountable for Rape: Eliminating the
“Defendant” Exception of Rape Shield Laws, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 591, 593–94
(1996). Hire calls this cross-examination the “second rape” endured by the victim. Id. at 593.
81. Id. at 594.
82. Id.
83. For a state-by-state guide to rape laws, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER &
KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S SEX LAWS (1996).
84. Estrich, supra note 1, at 1091.
85. David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 356 (2000). As a result,
most statutory attempts to diminish the resistance requirement, without simultaneously discarding
the force requirement, are merely “semantic.” Id. at 357.
86. Id. at 357–58.
87. Estrich, supra note 1, at 1091.
88. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 67, at 163. Spohn and Horney explain that in all six of
the jurisdictions they studied, officials were still “substantially affected by corroboration and
resistance factors in judging the likelihood of a jury conviction.” Id.
89. Kasubhai, supra note 58, at 59.
90. Id. at 58.
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merely lessening the marital exception’s impact.91 Louisiana is the only state
that still exempts husbands from charges of rape entirely.92
In addition to laws that favor marital rapists, sexist public attitudes toward
victims of marital rape are still common as well.93 Men, as well as women,
believe that consent is implied from the marital contract.94 Although women
promise only to “love and honor,” society imputes upon them a promise to
submit to violent, abusive rape, essentially taking away a married woman’s
right to say “no.” As a result, women who are regularly raped by their
physically abusive husbands,95 or (as is common) women who are raped by a
vengeful spouse during the course of separation or divorce,96 continue to find
little societal or legal support.97
Probably the most popular type of rape reform in the last decade has been
the rape shield statute, a reform effort that has encountered mixed results.98
Rape shield statutes prohibit the defense from introducing evidence of the
victim’s past sexual activities in order to prove consent, subject to certain
exceptions.99 The positive impact of shield statutes, however, has been greatly
limited by narrow readings of, and exceptions to, the rule.100
91. Id. at 58–59.
92. Id. at 59.
93. Id. For example, in 1992, a rape case arose in South Carolina in which a man physically
abused his wife, tied her up, taped her mouth shut, and raped her. Id. Despite the fact that this
entire ordeal was videotaped by the husband and shown to the jury, the jury, composed mostly of
women, acquitted the rapist. Id.
94. Chamallas, supra note 59, at 798.
95. Finkelhor and Yllo report that 50 percent of the women in their study had been raped by
their husbands twenty times or more. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 74, at 23. One woman
admitted, “[i]t happened half of the time we had sex during those three years.” Id.
96. Id. at 24–25.
97. Laws as well as societal attitudes reflect a certain degree of incredulousness at the notion
that a husband can rape his wife. Yet, both easily recognize other crimes committed by a husband
against his wife. A husband who beats or murders his wife is certainly subject to criminal and/or
civil liability, as is a husband who commits adultery (at least in certain states); the “marital
contract” apparently does not impute these rights upon a husband. The “contract” does, however,
provide him a right to rape. The law (and society) will therefore protect a woman from physical
violence, such as a slap in the face, but not from sexual violence, like forced penetration. It will
protect her from a husband who cheats, but not one who rapes. The absurdity of this reality
further underscores the degree of control the legal and social systems are willing to give men over
women’s sexual freedom.
98. The common argument in favor of rape shield statutes, and the argument relied upon by
state legislatures in passing such statutes, was that “information that the prosecuting witness
sleeps with her boyfriend or goes around with married men or has borne some illegitimate
children cannot help the jury decide on any reasoned factual basis whether or not she agreed to
relations with this person on this occasion.” SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 67, at 26.
99. Murphy, supra note 55, at 542.
100. See generally Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs’ Sexual Pasts: Coping With
Preconceptions Through Discretion, 51 EMORY L.J. 559 (2002).
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First, evidence of the victim’s sexual history is only barred when it would
be used to show consent; it is still admissible to support the defendant’s
mistake of fact defense, which states that a rapist who mistakenly believed that
his victim consented to sex is not guilty of rape.101 In jurisdictions that require
this mistake to be honest as well as reasonable, the mistake of fact exception
supports the idea that if a man knows a woman is sexually experienced, he is
reasonable in believing she consented to sex on the particular occasion in
question, regardless of her actions or protestations during the actual
encounter.102 Even if she fought back, shouted, cried, and said “no,” evidence
of her prior sexual acts will still be admitted to show that the rapist was
reasonable in interpreting all of these signs as consent. Essentially, this means
that any woman who has ever had sex before, even if only with her boyfriend
or husband, is subject to this ludicrous inference.103 Another common
exception is the “defendant exception,” which states that evidence of the
victim’s prior sexual acts is admissible to show consent if these acts were
between the victim and defendant.104 This exception rests on the incorrect
assumption that because a woman has consensual sex with a man on one
occasion, as is common in marriage especially, it is more likely that she
consented on all subsequent occasions.105 It is not hard to see how exceptions
such as these have greatly undercut the purpose of rape shield statutes, which

101. Sarah Gill, Dismantling Gender and Race Stereotypes: Using Education to Prevent Date
Rape, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 27, 58 (1996).
102. Murphy, supra note 55, at 541. According to Murphy, this belief is unreasonable.
Murphy states, “Sexual experience is not probative of whether a woman consented to sex on a
particular occasion; a reasonable person infers consent based on communication during the
encounter in question rather than on knowledge that a woman is sexually experienced.” Id. at
544.
103. Sarah Gill argues, “[u]ntil men can no longer claim that they are misled by societal
stereotypes about women’s sexualities, and until society becomes less accepting of such mistakes
of fact,” prosecutors will continue to fight a losing battle and rapists will continue to “mistake”
consent. Gill, supra note 101, at 58.
104. Hire, supra note 80, at 592.
105. Id. at 599. Hire explains that this assumption is incorrect for several reasons, grouping
these reasons into several different categories: (1) “Women are not slaves to their emotions.” Id.
at 601. Even if the victim married her attacker, and thus assumedly loved him, the “emotion of
love” present during the rape “bears no relation to the existence of her consent.” Id. at 602. (2)
“Past lack of force is not relevant to present lack of force.” Id. (3) “A woman’s mindset is not
static.” Id. Women can and do change their minds. Just because a woman was willing to have
sex on one particular occasion “does not make it more probable that her state of mind was the
same on a later occasion.” Id. at 603. (4) “Archaic stereotypes and invidious inferences.” Id.
The idea that when a woman consents once, she gives implied consent to all subsequent sexual
encounters with that person is based “on the same archaic stereotypes and invidious inferences
about women that instigated the enactment of rape shield laws in the first place.” Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

NO MEANS NO

1243

were meant to keep irrelevant evidence out of the trial in order to protect the
victim from unfair persecution.106
Rape law has traditionally reflected sexist male attitudes toward women
and women’s sexuality, and while reform efforts have helped, the same holds
true today. More must be done to change both the law and societal attitudes.
The next section will explore the ways in which a post-penetration statute is
likely to aid this effort.
IV. ILLINOIS’S STATUTE
On July 25, 2003, Illinois became the first state to codify the legitimacy of
a post-penetration rape claim through passage of Public Act 93-0389,107
popularly known as the “No Means No” law.108 This amendment states, “A
person who initially consents to sexual penetration or sexual conduct is not
deemed to have consented to any sexual penetration or sexual conduct that
occurs after he or she withdraws consent during the course of that sexual
penetration or sexual conduct.”109 The main impetus of this law’s passage was
the three-year controversy in California over the issue, the culmination of
which was the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re John Z., discussed
above.110 The statute’s sponsors explained, “With Illinois [sic] and California’s
laws being very similar, we wanted to craft a bill that would prevent us from
going down the same path in Illinois that California did.”111 As is discussed in
the next two Subsections, great potential exists for this statute to positively
impact rape law; however, serious limitations exist as well, making Illinois’s
“No Means No” statute a starting point rather than an ending one.
A.

Positive Effects of a Post-penetration Rape Statute

“[M]ost rape-case attrition appears to be due to a combination of the
victim’s unwillingness to seek legal redress, the prosecution’s burden of proof
106. Other exceptions include evidence of conduct with third parties to show that they, and
not the defendant, were the source of disease, pregnancy, or semen; evidence used to rebut sexual
conduct evidence introduced by the prosecutor; evidence that tends to show the victim’s bias
against the defendant or show the victim has motive to lie; evidence that the victim made
previous false rape allegations; and evidence of prior sexual encounters with third parties similar
to the one at issue with the defendant. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 67, at 26–27.
107. “No Means No,” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17 (2003), available at
http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?name=093-0389.
108. Jeff Goldblatt, Illinois First to Pass ‘No Means No’ Law, Fox News, at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,95184,00.html (Aug. 19, 2003).
109. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17(c) (2003).
110. Laura Jastram, Bill Ensures ‘No Means No’ in Illinois, THE DAILY ILLINI, July 30, 2003,
available at http://www.illinimedia.com/di/jul03/jul30/news/stories/news_story01.shtml.
111. Robert Baxter, Law Re-examines Consensual Sex, ROCKFORD REGISTER STAR, July 18,
2003, available at http://www.rrstar.com/localnews/your_community/belvidere/2003071813344.shtml.
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in criminal cases, and jurors’ attitudes.”112 This Section addresses the first and
third factors, examining how a post-penetration rape statute could increase
reporting rates and change public attitudes toward victims of rape, as well as
toward rape in general. In short, the Author argues that even if the postpenetration statute’s “impact is [largely] symbolic [it] may affect attitudes that
eventually change society,” although perhaps in subtle ways.113 The following
segments attempt to describe how such changes are likely to occur.
1.

Taking the First Step

Scholars have reported that “[t]he single most important reason why most
rapists are not punished is the failure of victims to report the crime to the
police, or their later refusal to cooperate as a prosecution witness.”114
Acquaintance rape occurs often—one in four women in the United States are
raped or are victims of attempted rape by the time they reach their midtwenties, and it has been estimated that approximately three-fourths of these
incidents are between people who know one another.115 It is in these very
cases, where the victim and attacker knew each other, that underreporting is
most likely.116 Victims of acquaintance rape are reluctant to report the assault
for a variety of reasons, most of which reflect outdated, yet widespread,
concepts of exactly what rape is. First, victims may choose not to report a
sexual assault because they are uncertain that what they experienced
constitutes rape.117 Such ambiguity could at least in part spawn from what
most of the public views as the “‘real’ rape.”118 The stereotype goes as
follows: Rape occurs between two strangers; the woman is attacked at night in
a dark alley; the assailant uses a weapon and is very violent; the victim
struggles, fights back, and most likely incurs bruises, cuts, broken bones, or
other serious, visible injuries in the process.119
Few, if any, victims would have trouble identifying the above-described
scenario as rape, for it is the image most commonly associated with sexual
assault. The common acquaintance rape, however, does not conform to this
stereotype. The most obvious divergence is that in acquaintance rape, the
assailant and victim know one another.120 The assailant is the victim’s friend,

112. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 4, at 1384.
113. Id. at 1292.
114. Id. at 1214.
115. HIDDEN CRIME, supra note 3, at ix.
116. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 4, at 1220–21.
117. Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim’s Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 293 (1993).
118. Martha R. Burt, Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, in HIDDEN CRIME, supra note 3, at
27.
119. Id.
120. MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL ET AL., DATE RAPE: THE SECRET EPIDEMIC: WHAT IT IS,
WHAT IT ISN’T, WHAT IT DOES TO YOU, WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 3 (1993).
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date, boyfriend, or a man who otherwise fails to fit into the category of
“stranger.”121 Most acquaintance rapists do not use a weapon, and most
victims do not incur visible injuries “beyond minor bruises or scratches.”122
Furthermore, acquaintance rapes tend to occur indoors, either in the assailant’s
or victim’s home.123 Acquaintance rapes differ from the stereotype in every
pertinent way, which, for many, makes identification of the act as “rape”
difficult. These victims “may not recognize the experience as rape because it
does not fit the paradigm of the stranger in the bushes; in rejecting the label
‘rape,’ [the victim] may have no word to explain the experience.”124
Even if substantial force is used by the assailant, the victim may still not
recognize the act as rape. In denying that their attack constitutes rape, victims
like this “mean that they were not raped in a way that is legally provable . . . .
[T]here was not enough violence against them to take it beyond the category of
‘sex.’”125 Like the rest of society, they see acquaintance rape as less serious
than the stereotype, or “real rape,”126 and therefore do not even categorize it as
rape at all. Other victims may themselves believe that they were raped, but do
not think that the law classifies their experience as such. This misperception is
particularly prevalent for victims of post-penetration rape who consent to the
sexual activity but thereafter change their mind. They may question “their
‘right’ to withdraw consent once sexual activity had begun and the man had
become aroused,”127 especially if the law itself is unclear on this issue. In
short, victims’ misidentification of their experience as outside the scope of
“rape,” as well as lack of knowledge regarding state rape laws, leads many
victims to stay silent. Reporting rates consequently remain at a minimum.
Second, a victim may not report a sexual assault because she fears she will
not be believed.128 Even though no empirical data exists to suggest that false
accusations of rape are more prevalent than false accusations of any other
crime, society tends to believe the myth that rapists are often unjustly

121. Burt, supra note 118, at 27. The term “acquaintance rape” is broad, and is not restricted
to rape perpetrated by husbands, boyfriends, or friends. For example, if a woman meets a man at
a bar and is raped later that night, it is acquaintance rape. BOUMIL ET AL., supra note 120, at 3.
If the rapist is the victim’s co-worker, but is someone with whom the victim has never spoken, it
is still acquaintance rape. Id. The key is that there is “some basis for an ongoing relationship that
creates an element of trust . . . in the victim.” Id.
122. Burt, supra note 118, at 27.
123. BOUMIL ET AL., supra note 120, at 3.
124. Coombs, supra note 117, at 293.
125. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 88 (1987)).
126. Gill, supra note 101, at 30.
127. Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 683 (1999).
128. Williams, supra note 70, at 52.
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accused.129 They believe that many women’s allegations of rape are really
attempts to cover up an embarrassing or unwanted pregnancy, or to punish a
man who has rejected them.130 Victims are amply aware of this “societal and
Victims
official skepticism toward victims of acquaintance rape.”131
themselves may have even held similar beliefs at one point. As a result, they
fear that unless they have strong evidence that a rape occurred, police officers,
prosecutors, and even members of their own family will accuse them of lying.
As previously discussed, strong evidence like weapons used or injuries
sustained by the victim are unlikely to exist in acquaintance rape cases.
Accordingly, victims do not report their attacks.132
A post-penetration rape statute has the potential to change social
misperceptions about rape and, in turn, increase reporting rates. Empirical
evidence indicates that rape reform statutes increase reporting rates among rape
victims133 as long as such statutes receive enough publicity to make their
existence known to the general public.134 A reform such as a post-penetration

129. Torrey, supra note 5, at 1028. The strength of the myth derives partly from “reports of a
high proportion of ‘unfounded’ rape complaints,” which are complaints dismissed by the police
after deciding that no rape took place. Id. Police officers decide not to pursue complaints for
several reasons, including the existence of a prior relationship between the victim and rapist, lack
of physical evidence, and intoxication of the victim (indicating that many officers themselves
subscribe to sexist rape myths). Id. at 1029. Actually, “[e]stimates indicate that only 2 percent of
all rape reports prove to be false, a rate comparable to the false report rate for other crimes.” Id.
at 1028.
130. JANET BODE, RAPE: PREVENTING IT; COPING WITH THE LEGAL, MEDICAL, AND
EMOTIONAL AFTERMATH 23–24 (1979).
131. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 4, at 1224.
132. Underreporting continues to be greatest in situations where the victim knew her assailant
and no weapon was used. Id. at 1223.
133. In fact, many of the reform efforts discussed in the previous section were initially passed
with reporting rates in mind. Most scholars believe such reforms have been successful, for
reporting rates have risen. Id. at 1224–25.
134. Id. at 1225–27. In Rape in the Criminal Justice System, David Bryden and Sonja
Lengnick summarize Cassia Spohn and Julie Horney’s findings. See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra
note 67. Spohn and Horney examined rape reform efforts in several jurisdictions within the U.S.
and reported the increase or decrease in reporting rates that followed. Id. at 1225. They found
that highly publicized rape reform statutes had the greatest likelihood of increasing reporting
rates. Id. at 1225–27. They also found that reporting rates increased in jurisdictions that passed
reforms legislatively, as opposed to states that attempted reform only judicially. Id. at 1227. For
example, Michigan passed a comprehensive rape reform law “package,” which received a great
deal of publicity, and reporting rates subsequently increased. Id. at 1226. Judicial reforms in
Washington, D.C, however, were followed by an actual decrease in reporting rates. Id. at 1226.
Bryden and Lengnick explain that, because the D.C. reforms “were achieved by judicial
decisions, and at different times, rape victims probably were unaware that the law had changed.”
Id. at 1227. Regular citizens are more likely to be aware of black-letter law set out by the
legislature than of judicial decisions handed down by state district or appellate courts, some of
which may not even be published or publicized in any way. Id. These findings offer guidance for
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rape statute could increase reporting rates in several ways. First, the statute
would enhance victims’ “sensitivity to the importance of rape, or their
impression of public support.”135 A statute that clearly states the legitimacy of
a post-penetration rape claim, even though the assault does not conform to the
rape stereotype will, at a minimum, help victims become aware that their
experience constitutes rape. They will now at least have a name for what has
happened to them, a category into which they can place their situation, which
perhaps will lead them to report rapes to the authorities. Further, the statutes
will raise awareness about states’ rape law policies. Victims will not only
know that their assault was rape, but they will also know that the law classifies
it as rape as well. This is particularly important for victims of post-penetration
rape, who, as mentioned before, tend to have trouble categorizing their
experiences.
A post-penetration rape statute could also give rise to “attitudinal changes”
in rape victims that could lead them to report their sexual assaults.136 A statute
rejecting the idea that it is never too late to change one’s mind and that once
“aroused,” men cannot be expected to restrain their sexual impulses could help
break down the mindset that rapes outside of the stereotypical definition are
without merit. Victims may grow to realize that women have the right to say
“no” at any point during intercourse. This realization could further diminish
the ambiguity many post-penetration rape victims experience after the assault,
questioning whether or not they were actually raped, and blaming themselves
for consenting to sex in the first place.
2.

Changing the Way People Think

So far, this Comment has focused on sexism in rape laws and has greatly
blamed these laws for the persecution of rape victims. However, in achieving
this end, these laws do not act alone. Laws do not return “not guilty” verdicts
in rape prosecutions; laws do not reverse rape convictions based on sexist
interpretations of “consent” or “resistance”; and laws do not attack victims
who take the witness stand, portraying them as “teases” deserving of rape. The
law plays none of these roles; individuals do, members of society—juries,
judges, and attorneys. 137 It is thus society’s attitudes toward rape and rape
the numerous states that have not yet decided the post-penetration rape issue—in order to increase
the impact of reform on reporting rates, these state legislatures should not wait for a postpenetration rape case to be decided by the judiciary, but should rather take a proactive approach
and pass post-penetration rape statutes.
135. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 4, at 1225.
136. Id.
137. See generally GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 200–33 (1989). LaFree interviewed former rape trial
jurors and found that jurors’ attitudes regarding male and female gender roles greatly influenced
their decisions to acquit. Id. at 225.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1248

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1229

victims that are largely responsible for the impact sexist laws are allowed to
make.
“[G]ender . . . stereotypes . . . embedded in our societal consciousness”
contribute to rape case attrition.138 In the arena of rape law, these stereotypes
are often reflected in rape myths. Rape myths are defined as “prejudicial,
stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, or rapists.”139 These
myths are extremely damaging to legitimate claims of rape, for they “have the
effect of denying that many instances involving coercive sex are actually
rapes.”140 “[P]eople use [rape myths] to justify dismissing an incident of
sexual assault from the category of ‘real’ rape.”141 This makes rape myths
very powerful, for excluding such assaults from the definition of “rape”
altogether makes their prosecution very difficult, and even impossible in some
instances.142 “Accepting or believing rape myths leads to a more restrictive
definition of rape and is thus rape-supportive . . . .”143
In Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, Martha Burt instructs readers that,
in order to understand rape myths, the reader must consider the legal definition
of rape “and then ask why, when faced with a sexual assault that fits this legal
definition, many people are still not willing to call this assault a rape.”144 The
reader should keep this question in mind while reading the next Section. Also,
while many rape myths exist, this Comment will only deal with those that are
most likely to affect victims of post-penetration rape.
a.

“No Means No”—The Simple Concept Society Ignores

“[W]e are still culturally ambivalent about what nonconsensual sex
actually is and whether it is always morally wrong.”145 Society as a whole has
trouble distinguishing between sex and rape, especially if the activity in
question falls outside rape’s stereotypical definition. This is evidenced by the
fact that a post-penetration rape statute is even necessary. If society considered
nonconsensual sex as rape, period, there would be no need for state legislatures
to explain to the public that a woman can withdraw consent once sex has
commenced. It would be self-evident. Unfortunately, though, it is apparently
not that clear of a concept. Society still grapples with the issue of when a
woman can say “no.” Rape myths exist to suggest that women are limited in
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141.
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143.
144.
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Gill, supra note 101, at 27.
Burt, supra note 118, at 26.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Burt, supra note 118, at 26.
Baker, supra note 127, at 665.
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the right to refuse sexual advances, thereby severely restricting women’s
sexual autonomy.146
Rape Myth Number One is that “[o]nce women entice men . . . . the men
are absolved . . . of their moral responsibility to control their sexual
appetites.”147 In other words, the victim’s behavior makes “the woman . . . an
unworthy victim.”148 In Telling the Victim’s Story, Mary I. Coombs separates
“situations in which fact finders discredit women’s claims” of rape into two
categories—”Not True” and “So What.”149 The “So What” category describes
the attitudes of those who adopt the above-mentioned myth. They “accept the
truth of the woman’s assertions as to what happened but decide that these
actions are not legitimate grounds for complaint by a ‘woman like that.’”150 A
“woman like that” apparently does not have the right to say “no,” and jurors
consequently “refuse to deem [her assault] ‘rape.’”151 What exactly a woman
has to do to be categorized as a “woman like that” is unclear—perhaps her
skirt is too short, her shirt too tight, or her behavior too flirtatious. Or maybe
the woman is drunk or sexually active.152 In Sex, Rape, and Shame, Katharine
A. Baker labels such qualities “neutralization factors.”153 According to the
myth, these qualities negate the woman’s right to refuse a man sex and cause
society to see “behavior that would generally be considered immoral . . . as
146. Regarding restrictions on sexual autonomy, Criminal Law Professor Stephen J.
Schulhofer remarks:
Of all our rights and liberties, few are as important as our right to choose freely whether
and when we will become sexually intimate with another person. Yet, as far as the law is
concerned, this right—the right to sexual autonomy—doesn’t exist. Citizens simply do
not have a legally recognized claim to protection for their freedom of sexual choice. . . .
If a man in a bar notices another patron . . . staggering from too many drinks, he can
carry her to a booth, stretch her out on the seat, tear off her clothes, and penetrate her. So
long as the woman is not actually unconscious, his conduct is perfectly legal, because the
woman never said “no,” and he never used what the law calls “force” . . . . [B]ecause
sexual autonomy isn’t protected in its own right, the law asks only whether the woman
proved her reluctance . . . . [and] never asks whether there is any indication that she
chose—and chose freely—to participate.”
SCHULHOFER, supra note 13, at 274, 278.
147. Baker, supra note 127, at 683.
148. Coombs, supra note 117, at 282.
149. Id. at 280.
150. Id. at 281. In contrast, the “Not True” category denies that a legally recognized sexual
assault even took place. Id. Juries decide that the victim’s story is too different from what they
already “know” about the types of men who rape and the types of women who are raped. Id. For
instance, only uneducated, lower-class men rape, and “[w]omen who appear sexually available
were not really raped, because they must have said ‘yes.’” Id. As a result, juries conclude that
these women must be lying, fueling the rape myth that a large percentage of women make false
accusations of rape. Id. at 282.
151. Id. at 281–82.
152. Id. at 283.
153. Baker, supra note 127, at 684.
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justifiable under certain conditions.”154 Simply put, such factors neutralize
society’s willingness to classify an assault as rape.155
Rape Myth Number Two deals not with whether a woman can say no, but
rather with what the woman means when she says it. Directly conflicting with
the concept that “no means no,” Myth Two states that when a woman says
“no,” she really means “yes.”156 This myth is grounded in the assumption that
“[a]ggression and [v]iolence [a]re [m]erely [an] ‘[a]rt of [s]eduction.’”157 Men
are aggressive and will naturally pursue, while women are passive and will
naturally feign resistance.158 Therefore, when a woman says “no,” or even
when she remains silent, what she really means is that she wants the man to
engage in “aggressive or even violent convincing.”159 But whatever she
means, she “‘never mean[s] no.’ At some level, women . . . . always . . . .
‘want it,’ no matter what they say.”160 This sexual stereotype, portraying men
as aggressive and women as passive, fuels the idea that sex is game, with men
playing the offense, women the defense.161 As in any game, “one wins and the
other loses . . . one rapes and the other is raped.”162 However archaic these
assumptions are, many men, either because they are lying, “dense, selfdeluded, or driven by wishful thinking,” still report that they believe that “no”
means “yes.”163 A study of college students in Hawaii reported that 50.9
percent of men think a woman means “yes” when she says “no.”164 On
average, these men indicated that “a woman had to say ‘no’ 2.6 times before

154. Id.
155. The prevalence of these neutralization factors is great. One study of high school students
in Los Angeles reported that 56 percent of women and 76 percent of men thought forced sex was
acceptable under some circumstances. Id. at 679. The Author acknowledges that this particular
survey is dated, but notes that the societal attitudes its findings represent are probably still
widespread. Id. at 679–80.
156. Torrey, supra note 5, at 1014–15.
157. Gill, supra note 101, at 46.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Burt, supra note 118, at 30.
161. Kasubhai, supra note 58, at 51. The Author bases this analogy on the writings of JeanJacques Rousseau, who stated, “To win this silent consent is to make use of all the violence
permitted in love. To read it in the eyes. . .in spite of the mouth’s denial. . . . .If he then
completes his happiness, [i.e. rapes her] he is not brutal, he is decent.” Id. For theories that come
to a conclusion similar to Rousseau’s, consider Locke’s and Hobbes’s theories on women’s
submission to men’s desires. Id. at 48–50.
162. Id. at 51.
163. SCHULHOFER, supra note 13, at 60. Schulhofer points out, “These are the men to whom
the emphatic warning—’no means no’— is addressed. It’s high time that these men ‘get it.’” Id.
Clearly, while “no means no” has become a well-known feminist view, and is facially a very
simple concept, it is by no means “obvious and uninteresting.” Id. at 59.
164. Baker, supra note 127, at 668.
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they would believe her.”165 The concept that “no means no” is apparently not
obvious to many.
Both of these myths infringe upon women’s sexual freedom, either by
denying women the right to make their own decisions about sex, or by
characterizing women as incapable of knowing their own minds.166 A postpenetration rape statute, though, rejects these myths, weakening their
prevalence. First, in order to dispel Myth One, which states that certain factors
annul a woman’s right to say “no,” circumstances such as drunkenness or
flirtatiousness need to lose their “neutralization” status. Public attitudes need
to change to accept a more modern, less sexist, view of women’s behavior,
specifically rejecting the idea that certain circumstances sanction rape.167 A
post-penetration rape statute could aid in doing just this. The statute addresses
the ultimate neutralization factor—a woman who has actually consented to sex.
Such a woman would surely fall into the “woman like that” category discussed
above, for not only is she probably sexually active, or at least has had sex
before, but she also consented to have sex on the particular occasion in
question. Under the myth, these circumstances would deny the woman’s right
to complain if the man forces her to continue intercourse.
A post-penetration rape statute, however, nullifies this scenario. The
statute explicitly provides a woman in the above situation a cause of action
against her attacker. Regardless of what the victim was wearing, how much
alcohol she drank, or whether she initially consented to sex, the assault
constitutes rape. The statute makes clear that a “woman like that” still has the
legal right to say “no,” and not even the ultimate neutralization factor can take
this right away.168 Furthermore, since the “ultimate” factor (consent to sex)
fails, it follows that all lesser factors such as drunkenness or dress must also
fail. While the law cannot force jurors and other members of society to stop
considering these neutralization factors when making their decisions of guilt, it
at least has the potential to change their attitudes and their treatment of rape
victims.
165. Id.
166. Proponents of Illinois’s statute had similar hopes. Kelly Henry, a legal advocate for
Rape Crisis Services in Illinois, stated, “This is a step in the right direction because it is going to
get people talking about what is sexual assault and what is not sexual assault. . . . Cultural
attitudes can change from this law being out there.” Jastram, supra note 110.
167. See Baker, supra note 127, at 684. Baker proposes
If there was an underlying consensus that what date rapists did was morally
wrong . . . neutralizations would be irrelevant. If taking sex without consent were seen as
something completely other than consensual sex, if it were seen more like sex with a four
year old, then no degree of drunkenness and no manner of dress could excuse the action.
The prevalence and power of the neutralization factors in date rape situations suggest an
extreme societal ambivalence about the deviance of the act.
Id.
168. See Jastram, supra note 110.
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Similarly, a post-penetration rape law weakens Myth Two as well. There
is a great danger that women who initially consent to sex and then withdraw
that consent post-penetration will fall victim to the “no means yes” myth. In
this situation, where the male is already engaged in sex, he is even more likely
to disregard the protestations of his victim—if she consented to sex in the first
place, she surely could not mean it when she says “no” now. Post-penetration
rape statutes clear up this “ambiguity” for the rapist. Illinois’s statute is even
popularly labeled the “No Means No” statute.169 This title reinforces the
argument that one of the statute’s purposes is to educate men on the meaning
of “no.” It is not code for “yes” or “maybe” or “please force me to have sex.”
Shockingly to some, it actually means “no,” a revelation that could at least
partially diminish a rapist’s defense that he thought his victim’s protests
constituted consent.
b.

Victim-Blaming: The Rapist’s Best Friend

Simply put, society blames victims for their own rape.170 Since the victim
is to blame, punishing the rapist is viewed as unjust. The rapist therefore goes
free, a reality that makes victim-blaming significantly dangerous to the success
of rape prosecutions.
Rape Myth Three states that the victim deserved to be raped. This myth
“admit[s] that there was sex and that the sex was forced, but [holds] the woman
responsible—therefore the act was not a rape.”171 Two facets of this myth
merit analysis. The first version of this myth is based on the idea that women
who violate their proscribed gender norms deserve “whatever they get.” One
may wonder what gender norms a woman must violate to be deemed
blameworthy for a violent act perpetrated solely by her attacker. According to
the myth, if the woman “was flirting; if she was attractively dressed; if she
was, in the man’s perception, a tease; if she went out with a man, necked with
him, and invited him to her apartment for coffee; even if she only said ‘hello’
to him at the office—it was her fault.”172 Based on these wide-ranging
categories of behavior, it would not be too far of a stretch to say that, under the
myth, any contact with a member of the opposite sex forms a sufficient basis to
blame the victim. Only if a woman keeps herself completely isolated from all
men, making sure not to exude any form of sexuality, no matter how mild, is
she worthy of protection from sexual attacks. Only then does she not deserve
to be raped.173
169. Goldblatt, supra note 108.
170. HUBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAW 54 (1980).
171. Burt, supra note 118, at 31.
172. Id.
173. In contrast, men are free to flirt, or even engage in sexual activities, with as many
women as desired without violating any gender norms and without being forced to suffer violent
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While this last statement may seem a bit facetious, it is not too far off the
mark. Society sympathizes with victims of rape by strangers, but not victims
of rape by acquaintances.174 The public, and more specifically juries, will
blame a rape victim if her “pre-rape behavior violated traditional norms of
female prudence or morality.”175 Understandably, the most common defense
of an accused acquaintance rapist is that his victim asked for it—she, not he,
provoked the attack.176 The simplest rationale for this victim-blaming myth
“appeals to an injunction against sexually provocative behavior on the part of
women.” 177 A woman who violates this injunction “deserves to suffer the
consequences.”178
In Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, Lois Pineau argues that, in countering
this rape myth, the question to be asked should be, “Why shouldn’t a woman
be sexually provocative? Why should this behavior warrant any kind of
aggressive response whatsoever?”179 She warns, though, that in making this
argument, stiff resistance will be met, for “[e]ven people who find nothing
wrong or sinful with sex itself, in any of its forms, tend to suppose that women
must not behave sexually unless they are prepared to carry through on some
fuller course of sexual interaction.”180 It is not just the extremely conservative
who maintain this oppressive rape myth—the sexually liberated do as well.
The second version of this victim-blaming, “women deserve it” myth is
based on the idea that women should be held responsible for their own rapes
pursuant to the legal concept of contributory negligence. In other words,
despite the fact that negligence is not a defense to rape,181 “women will face
juries that are prejudiced against victims whom they believe engaged in
contributory behavior.”182 Women are deemed to have “contributed” to their

consequences. Society does not blame or judge them either, leaving men’s sexual autonomy
absolute.
174. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 4, at 1202–03.
175. Id. at 1204.
176. Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, in SEX, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 434
(Lori Gruen & George E. Panichas eds., 1997). One defense attorney put it this way:
Though I’m embarrassed to admit it, I used to bring the woman’s character in all the time.
If I was successful in convincing the jury that she was a “loose woman who gave it away
on every street corner,” they’d disbelieve her, even in a stranger rape. (Sex past) always
mattered, even in a brutal rape. You could hint to the jury that she invited the attack.
JEANNE C. MARSH ET AL., RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM 54 (1982).
177. Pineau, supra note 176, at 434.
178. Id. This myth is somewhat ironic. People willing to chastise women for violating their
“pure” gender norms are the same ones arguing that women who display any degree of sexuality
lose their right to say “no” and should follow through with sex.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 4, at 1328.
182. Hire, supra note 80, at 591.
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sexual attacks by getting “‘into the game’ of sexuality” in the first place.183
Either by flirting, going on dates, or by engaging in mild sexual activity with a
man, the woman is responsible for whatever violent consequences follow.
Once in the game, “society loads her with the full responsibility for whatever
happens.”184 If the game gets rough and the woman is raped, it is her own
fault, for she should have known better. In essence, she “asked for it.”185 By
flirting or dating, she could not have expected the man to realize that she was
looking for more than sex, that her actions did not necessarily mean she
wanted to have intercourse. The myth “do[es] not differentiate between her
‘asking for’ companionship, friendship, and a date and her ‘asking for’
rape.”186
Societal support for the idea of contributory negligence in acquaintance
rape is ubiquitous. In The Second Assault, the authors conducted a survey in
which they asked respondents, “[W]hat is the one thing that would reduce rape
the most? . . . [T]he majority of responses fell into two . . . categories: a ‘law
and order’ approach and a perceived need for women to change their
behavior.”187 According to the survey responses, women needed to change
how they acted, what they wore, the places they went, and the nature of their
interaction with men.188 The authors found that this “perceived need for
women to accept responsibility for alleviating rape [was] consistent with [the]
perception of the problem as ‘caused’ by female behavior.”189 Few
respondents saw societal problems or sex-role problems as “causally related to
rape.”190 Consistent with this finding, another study of public perceptions of
rape found that sixty-six percent of those polled believed that women provoke
rape by their dress or behavior, thirty-four percent thought “women should be
183. Burt, supra note 118, at 31.
184. Id. Jurors interviewed by Gary LaFree made statements consistent with the argument
that jurors’ victim-blaming attitudes contribute to rape acquittals. The most extreme example
comes from a male juror who stated, “I don’t think a woman can be raped . . . . I ask why are they
out at that time of the night? What did they do to provoke it? . . . She can scream and kick if
she’s awake and [really] doesn’t want it.” LAFREE, supra note 137, at 225.
185. One male juror noted, “Some women put themselves on men. It is the way that they
dress. It is in the clothes.” LAFREE, supra note 137, at 225. Other jurors noted that “through
their clothing and behavior women often ‘ask’ to be raped.” Id.
186. Burt, supra note 118, at 31. Again, men, on the other hand, never lose their right to say
“no.”
187. JOYCE E. WILLIAMS & KAREN A. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND PUBLIC
ATTITUDES 120 (1981).
188. Id. “This attitude is, of course, role-restrictive for the female since it disallows freedom
in movement, dress, and interpersonal relationships.” Id. at 123.
189. Id. at 123.
190. Id. For a thorough, complex analysis of the impact of rape on victims as well as societal
attitudes regarding cause and prevention of rape, see generally id. The authors “focus[] on how
rape was experienced by some victims in one geographic area as juxtaposed to their community’s
perception of rape.” Id. at xi.
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held responsible for preventing their own rape,” and eleven percent reported
that women who are raped must have been “asking for it.”191
Contrary to the frequent incidence of blaming victims of acquaintance
rape, the general concept of blaming victims for their own attacks is quite
novel and unprecedented. “Date rape is the only type of criminal conduct that
people often believe was caused by the victim’s behavior, not the
assailant’s.”192 No parallel exists in other crimes.193 If a person is strolling
through a dangerous neighborhood late at night and is robbed “no one denies
that the crime happened, even when it is clear that the victim used poor
judgment.”194 And yet society, in an effort to retain rigid control over
women’s sexuality, is more than willing to blame victims of rape. Society is
willing to assert that because a woman allowed a man to walk her home, or
come into her apartment for a cup of coffee, she is to blame for the violent
crime that thereafter ensued; she is responsible for the pain, injuries,
pregnancies, or potentially deadly sexually transmitted diseases she acquired
pursuant to the forcible intercourse. While it is illogical at best to hold these
victims blameworthy while sympathizing with victims of other crimes, crimes
much less physically or psychologically damaging, society nonetheless
continues to do so.
Passage of post-penetration rape statutes would be a good first step in an
effort to minimize the harmful effect of both facets of the victim-blaming rape
myth. First, in much the same ways that the statute would aid in negating
“neutralization factors” that take away a woman’s right to say “no” to sex,195 it
would likewise aid in decreasing the incidence of victim-blaming. As
discussed earlier, society blames a victim for her own rape if her character or
behavior violates “traditional norms of female prudence.”196 The statute,
however, is meant to apply to women who initially agree to have intercourse
but thereafter withdraw consent.197 It specifically faces the reality that women
can and do have sex. And even though the women targeted by the statute
(those who consent to sex) surely violate the traditional gender norm that
women are to be chaste, the statute correctly places blame not on the victim for

191. FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 170, at 54. Twelve percent of those polled actually
reported that “[i]f a woman is going to be raped she might as well relax and enjoy it,” sixteen
percent believed that “[i]t would do some women some good to get raped,” and six percent said
that “[r]ape serves as a way to put or keep women in their ‘place.’” Id. at 50–51.
192. Gill, supra note 101, at 31.
193. Burt, supra note 118, at 32.
194. Id.
195. Baker, supra note 127, at 684.
196. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 4, at 1204.
197. Jastram, supra note 110.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1256

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1229

her lack of purity, but rather on the rapist.198 At least symbolically, this stance
could help change the sexual double standard innate in victim-blaming.199
Furthermore, the statute, at least on its face, negates the concept of
contributory negligence. According to the myth, which again states that
women contribute to sexual assault by dressing provocatively, going on dates,
and being flirtatious, initially agreeing to sex would be the pinnacle of
contributory behavior. The victim did not just wear a low-cut shirt or ask her
date up to her apartment; rather, she actually agreed to have intercourse. The
statute, though, places no contribution liability on the victim. Read in the
terms of the myth, the statute even assumes the victim will “contribute” by
initially consenting to sex.200 The blame, however, falls not on her, but instead
on her attacker. As a result, legitimizing post-penetration rape is a step toward
loosening society’s sexist constraints on women; it is a step toward treating
victims of acquaintance rape with the same respect and sympathy society has
long afforded victims of every other violent crime.
c.

Men Can Control the World, but Not Their Sex Drives?

One of the oldest and most scientifically unsound rape myths is that
“[m]en [c]annot [c]ontrol [t]heir [s]exual [u]rges [a]fter a [w]oman [h]as
‘[t]urned [t]hem [o]n.’”201 Many men and women alike believe that if a
woman entices a man, the man is helpless to control his sexual impulses;
therefore, any sexual activity that occurs thereafter, however violent or forced
it may be, is understandable.202 A UCLA study reported that fifty-four percent
of teenage boys surveyed thought it was okay “to force sex if the woman
198. Id. Ross Wantland, a coordinator of sexual assault education in Illinois, commented,
“The terminology (of this law) takes the emphasis off of the victim and puts it on the perpetrator.”
Id.
199. Lois Pineau, supra note 176, at 436, attacks victim-blaming using contract law. She
explains that even if a woman does assume a contractual obligation to have sex with a man
through her dress, behavior, or through initially consenting to sex, “whatever the terms of a
contract, there is no private right to enforce it. So if I make a contract with you on which I
renege, the only permissible recourse for you is through due legal process,” not through violence.
Id. Pineau continues:
Thus, even if we assume that a woman has initially agreed to an encounter, her agreement
does not automatically make all subsequent sexual activity to which she submits
legitimate. If during coitus a woman should experience pain, be suddenly overcome with
guilt or fear of pregnancy, or simply lose her initial desire, those are good reasons for her
to change her mind. Having changed her mind, neither her partner nor the state has any
right to force her to continue . . . . Thus establishing that consent occurred at a particular
point during a sexual encounter should not conclusively establish the legitimacy of the
encounter. What is needed is a reading of whether she agreed throughout the encounter.
Id.
200. Jastram, supra note 110.
201. Gill, supra note 101, at 48.
202. Burt, supra note 118, at 32.
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changed her mind after somehow indicating that she would have sex with
him.”203 A different study found that fifty percent of high school males
surveyed “believed that if a female ‘gets him physically excited’ or ‘says she’s
going to have sex with him and then changes her mind,’” forcing her to have
intercourse is acceptable.204 These findings demonstrate the pervasiveness of
the myth that men are justified in being helpless agents of their libido.205
No evidence exists, however, to corroborate the assertion that sexual
arousal cannot be stopped or that desire is uncontrollable.206
While there may be a few seconds in the “plateau” period just prior to orgasm
in which people are “swept” away by sexual feelings to the point where we
could justifiably understand their lack of heed for the comfort of their partner,
the greater part of a sexual encounter comes well within the bounds of morally
responsible control of our own actions.207

The myth simply has no basis in reality, but is rather an excuse for men “not to
be held responsible for their own excitement and what they do with it.”208
Paradoxically, both men and women are eager to hold women responsible, “not
only for keeping themselves chaste but also for controlling men’s sexuality.”209
Again, men are not to be held responsible for their actions, women are.
According to the myth, because “men’s sexuality is not active but is simply a
response to stimuli supplied by women,” men cannot be expected to control
themselves once the stimulus is supplied. 210 In Acquaintance Rape: The
Hidden Crime, Martha Burt explains how ludicrous such a theory is:
To be somewhat facetious, this myth implies that if a scantily clad woman
walks down the street and a man sees her, he will go out of control, the
situation can end only in rape, and the man is not responsible for it because he
saw her knees and they drove him over the edge. Put this way, its should be
obvious that this myth excuses men’s assaultive behavior and helps remove
such incidents from the category of “real” rapes.211

Post-penetration rape statutes such as the one in place in Illinois further
dispel this myth. The statute places on men the sole responsibility for
controlling their sexual urges. It makes clear that even once sex has

203. Gill, supra note 101, at 49.
204. Id.
205. For a brief analysis of the role of mass media in fostering rape myths, see Torrey, supra
note 5, at 1031–37.
206. Pineau, supra note 176, at 437.
207. Id.
208. Burt, supra note 118, at 33.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 32.
211. Id.
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commenced, if the woman changes her mind, intercourse must cease.212 By
the time consent is withdrawn, the man will surely be aroused and will most
likely be under the impression that the woman was willing to complete
intercourse. The statute itself even rests on this assumption—it assumes that
both parties were initially willing and sex has commenced (meaning the male
is of course aroused). And yet, fully aware that the man will be sexually
excited, the statute does not absolve him of accountability if he fails to control
his actions. Rather, it again shifts responsibility away from the victim and
places it where it rightly should fall—on the rapist. He will be guilty of rape if
he continues the sexual act, and no amount of arousal will insulate him from
this charge.
B.

Limits on the Impact of a Post-penetration Rape Statute

Unfortunately, rape reform efforts in general do not tend to increase the
incidence of rape convictions. 213 In Rape in the Criminal Justice System,
David Bryden and Sonja Lengnick point out various reasons why. Bryden and
Lengnick explain that, despite reforms, the burden of proof remains on the
prosecution, and “[y]ou can’t legislate a credible rape victim.”214 As explained
earlier in this comment, even in states with rape shield laws, the victim’s
sexual history will still oftentimes be admitted into evidence.215 Even if it is
not, it is likely that at least some evidence of the victim’s character will be
allowed.216
Similarly, evidence related to the victim’s “contributory
negligence” will inevitably be revealed through testimony about the events that
led up to the rape.217 Therefore, regardless of the rape reform law in place and
the amount and kinds of evidence it successfully excludes from the juror’s
ears, it is still highly likely that the jury will hear evidence from which it can
infer, however unfairly, that the victim is to blame.
Along these same lines, a post-penetration statute will probably not
increase conviction rates either. While a post-penetration statute has the
potential to increase reporting rates and dissipate gender stereotypes and rape
myths, it alone cannot perform miracles. Most importantly, a post-penetration
rape statute that does no more than state that consent can be withdrawn will
most likely not help the prosecutor fulfill her burden of proof, for the statute
“does not change the definition of sexual assault or the process of proving what
was communicated.”218 The prosecutor still has to jump all of the typical
212. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17 (2003) (“No Means No”),
http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?name=093-0389.
213. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 4, at 1284.
214. Id. at 1287.
215. Id..
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1288.
218. Jastram, supra note 110.

available

at
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hurdles in proving that the victim withdrew consent and that she
communicated such withdrawal to the defendant. The prosecutor must
overcome strong societal biases against rape victims, attempt to keep the
victim’s sexual history out of evidence, and work with definitions of “consent”
and “force” that tend to be pro-rapist. Sexist stereotypes and rape myths often
support jury findings that the victim consented.219 Jurors can (and most likely
will) just as easily use these same stereotypes to find that the victim continued
to consent, i.e., did not withdraw consent mid-act. So while a post-penetration
rape statute has the potential to impact sexist societal attitudes toward rape, it
has several practical limits as well.
V. CONCLUSION
Sexism in rape law greatly impedes rape victims’ ability to obtain justice,
and it will continue to do so until serious reforms take place, reforms that
recognize women’s right to sexual autonomy. A post-penetration rape law like
the one in place in Illinois is a first step toward achieving this end. Changing
deeply engrained social stereotypes regarding any issue is a slow, formidable
task, and a post-penetration rape statute will surely not be this rule’s exception.
However, simply because a reform is unlikely to change the world does not
mean that it is a pointless endeavor. At least symbolically, a post-penetration
rape law represents the way the public needs to view rape—as nonconsensual
sex, regardless of any other factor, including whether the victim and assailant
were acquaintances or were already engaged in sex when consent was
withdrawn. In the same vein, it represents how the public should view sex
altogether—as a privilege, not a right.
Of course, even the statute’s symbolic value will fall short of the ultimate
goal of changing society’s anti-rape-victim attitudes. Wide-ranging reforms
are needed and are not necessarily restricted to legislative or even judicial
reforms. In Dismantling Gender and Race Stereotypes, Sarah Gill proposes
that the best way to change public attitudes is through education.220 Educating
young people about “the definition of date rape, the statistics of date rape
among teen-agers, why men and women are silent victims and rarely report
rape, rape trauma syndrome, the role of socialization, steps to use to prevent
rape, and how to help a rape survivor” is crucial to raising a more rapeconscious generation less likely to blindly believe harmful rape myths.221
Practical reforms such as this, teamed with strong legislative and judicial
reforms, have the potential to change the way that we as a society view rape,
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consent, and victims of sexual assault. Post-penetration rape statutes are just
one step in women’s journey toward sexual freedom.
DANA VETTERHOFFER

